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KEEP YOUR LAWS OFF MY DOMAIN NAME: HOW A 
MISINTERPRETATION OF “REGISTRATION” IN THE 
ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
VIOLATES THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
Clarke D. Cotton* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2015-2016 Republican primary season was nothing if not unique. 
The primary debates had to be split into “A” teams and “B” teams with 
the opposing candidates being asked to pledge on national television that 
they would, in fact, support the eventual nominee.  The 2015-2016 
Republican primary was far from ordinary.  
It’s no wonder, then, that perhaps one of the more ridiculous and 
hilarious incidents of the primary season flew under the radar.  As early 
as December 2015, potential voters that typed “JebBush.com” into their 
Internet browser were not taken to a website supporting the former 
Governor of Florida.  Instead, they were redirected to the website of the 
eventual Republican nominee, Donald J. Trump.1 
The official Jeb Bush for President website was “Jeb2016.com,” but 
Jeb Bush’s campaign team, when creating the website, neglected to buy 
up similarly-worded websites.  Thus, the team inadvertently left open 
the opportunity for others to buy those domain names. The Trump 
campaign denied responsibility for the domain name purchase, noting 
that the true owner’s identity was kept anonymous by the registrar, 
Fabulous.com.2   
Moreover, Bush’s misfortune was not limited to a re-direct to the 
Trump website. Two more websites: “JebBushforPresident.com” and 
“JebBushforPresident.net” were far from supportive of the Republican 
candidate. “JebBushforPresident.com” is an LGBTQ blog run by a gay 
couple, C.J. and Charlie.3 While the website is not strictly anti-Bush, the 
couple chose the domain name after Bush likened LGBTQ rights to 
elevating sodomy.4 Conversely, JebBushforPresident.net does not pull 
any punches, posting a large “NOT” over “Jeb Bush for President” 
header on the website.  
 
            * Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Yanan Wang, JebBush.com redirects to Trump, but for a real kick, click on 
TedCruzForAmerica.com, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/17/jebbush-com-redirects-to-trumps-
site-but-wait-till-you-see-where-tedcruzforamerica-com-goes/.  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
1
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Jeb Bush was not the only candidate who saw his name parodied; 
“TedCruzforAmerica.com” kept visitors on their toes by sending 
Internet surfers to President Obama’s Affordable Care Act website, to a 
re-direct of the Human Right’s Campaign, or to an apparent 
advertisement to immigrate to Canada, the country in which Cruz was 
born.5  Today, “TedCruzforAmerica.com” sends viewers to a politically-
charged dating website called “Maple Match,”6  which connected 
Americans with possible Canadian love interests in case the 2016 
presidential election yielded an undesirable result.7 
Despite the media coverage given to the misfortunes of Republican 
candidates Bush and Cruz, the Democrats were not immune to website 
issues. On the Democratic side, both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders 
faced similar problems. Although the link is no longer active, a website 
apparently dedicated to Clinton—“hillaryclinton2016.com”— took 
viewers to a website with a Huffington Post-like layout, but with the 
headline “Hillary’s Gender Fabrications,” which in turn linked readers 
to a Washington Times article about Clinton using her gender to her 
advantage during the election.8  
Most of the Hillary-related domain names were owned by one person, 
Janet LaCelle, a retired factory worker.9  LaCelle purchased numerous 
domain names, including “ElectHillary.com” and “ReelectHillary.com,” 
over a decade ago and hoped to sell them for thousands of dollars.10 
However, it does not appear that the Clinton campaign entertained any 
of LaCelle’s offers or attempted to pursue legal action against her.  
Finally, some of the Sanders websites ranged from supportive to 
ridiculous. “BernieSandersForPresident.com” fully endorsed the 
Vermont Senator with a homepage declaring in an excited, albeit 
grammatically painful, voice: “Bernie Sanders for President 2016 / Run 
Bernie Run / A rare politation [sic] who refuses PAC money and he is a 
voice of reason in a divided country the USA.”11 Another site, 
“BernieforPresident.com,” offered potential voters an opportunity to 
cast an online vote for Bernie Sanders or for Bernie Lomax, the 
deceased financial executive in the comedy “Weekend at Bernie’s.”12 
A far more unique approach, however, was the website 
 
 5. Id.   
 6. MAPLE MATCH, http://TedCruzforAmerica.com (last visited December 2, 2016).  
 7. Id.   
 8. Wang, supra  note 1.  
 9. Id.   
 10. Id.   
 11. Id. See also http://www.BernieSandersForPresident.com (the current website has been 
updated supporting Sanders for a 2020 run).  
 12. Dan Good, Jeb Bush Pranked by Donald Trump in Presidential Domain Game, New York 
Daily News (Feb. 17, 2016 at 1:53pm).  
2
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“ElectBernie.com.” This website, which is still operating as of February 
10, 2017, takes visitors to a website dedicated to traffic safety.13  The 
website does not appear to endorse Sanders or any other political 
candidate. In fact, it seems to stay out of politics altogether. The 
“About” section of the website addresses the domain name and poses 
the question, “Why is your site called ElectBernie.com?”14 The page 
provides its own answer, or rather the lack thereof, stating, “That’s a 
great question and one day we’ll have an answer.”15 
While many of these websites may seem funny or ridiculous, they do 
raise very interesting questions about the rights people have to their own 
name, their business’s name, and domain names that are bought for an 
unknown use. This Comment will explore the Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) and its effects on website 
registrants. Part II of this Comment identifies and discusses the pertinent 
parts of the ACPA. Part III explores conflicting interpretations of the 
word “registration” under the ACPA between the Third and Ninth 
Circuit Courts. Finally, Part IV identifies why the Ninth Circuit was 
correct and explores how the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, properly 
applied, protects the rights of all parties and could have been used by the 
Third Circuit to reach the same conclusion.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
The background section of this Comment explores the enactment of 
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and the 
reasons for its enactment. Moreover, this section investigates the text of 
the statute, including the requirement of bad faith during a registration.   
A.  The Enactment of the ACPA 
Cybersquatting, also known as cyberpiracy, “consists of registering, 
trafficking in, or using domain names (Internet addresses) that are 
identical or confusingly similar to trademarks with the bad-faith intent to 
profit from the goodwill of the trademarks.”16  In an attempt to prevent 
cybersquatting, Congress enacted the ACPA.17 Essentially, 
cybersquatters register numerous domain names and then hold those 
domain names at ransom in an effort to extort money from a person or a 
 
 13. ELECT BERNIE, http://www.electbernie.com (last visited February 10, 2017).   
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, H.R. 106-412, 106th Cong. §1 (1999).  
 17. Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2009).  
3
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company more commonly associated with that domain name.18 
Cybersquatting also occurs where the cybersquatter “intend[s] to profit 
by diverting customers from the website of the trademark owner to the 
defendant’s own website, where those consumers would purchase the 
defendant’s products or services instead of the trademark owner’s.”19 
Through either of these acts, cybersquatters become civilly liable to the 
owner of the trademark because the ACPA provides, in pertinent part:  
 
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a 
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark 
under this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the 
parties, that person--  
 
 (i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a 
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section; and 
  
 (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that –  
 
  (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of 
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar 
to that mark …20 
 
However, the ACPA does not manage the registration of domain 
names. That responsibility is left to the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is responsible for 
overseeing multiple third-party registries.21  The Ninth Circuit has 
explained the process for the registration of a domain name:  
 
[T]here are three primary actors in the domain name system. First, 
companies called “registries” operate a database (or “registry”) for 
all domain names within the scope of their authority [e.g., all .com, 
.net, .gov, etc. domain names]. Second, companies called 
“registrars” register domain names with registries on behalf of 
those who own the names. Registrars maintain an ownership 
record for each domain name they have registered with a registry. 
Action by a registrar is needed to transfer ownership of a domain 
name from one registrant to another. Third, individuals and 
companies called “registrants” own the domain names. Registrants 
 
 18. Supra note 16.  
 19. Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found for Apologetic Info and Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1058 
(10th Cir. 2008).  
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2012).  
 21. Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 775 (11th Cir. 2015).  
4
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interact with the registrars, who in turn interact with the 
registries.22 
 
The ACPA applies to all Internet domain names, regardless of 
whether the domain name was registered before or after the enactment 
of the ACPA.23  Thus, for one to prevail in an ACPA claim, the party 
must show: “(1) registration of a domain name, (2) that was ‘identical or 
confusingly similar to’ a mark that was distinctive at the time of 
registration, and (3) ‘bad faith intent’ at the time of registration.”24  
Moreover, the ACPA defines “mark” as something that is “widely 
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”25 
However, the ACPA does not define the word “registration,” which 
leads to a significant jurisdictional split.  Courts determined that an 
initial registration – the first time that a domain name is registered – 
constituted a “registration” under the ACPA. However, courts are split 
on what actions constitute a “registration” after that initial registration.26  
Once a registrant has registered a domain name, they can modify that 
registration in a multitude of ways, including: updating contact and 
billing information, switching to a “private” registration, switching 
between registrars, changing the name of the registrant without updating 
billing information, and transferring both the domain name and billing 
information to another party.27  
The multitude of options for a registrant has left the courts with the 
task of deciding how “registration” and any subsequent actions should 
be interpreted. The Third Circuit chose to liken the registration of a 
domain name to contract law.28 Specifically, the Third Circuit held that 
the word “registration” “includes a new contract at a different registrar 
and to a different registrant.”29 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit interpreted “registration” under 
property law, finding that the registrant receives a property right in the 
domain name when he or she registers it.30 Thus, the registrant can 
transfer that “property” to others.31 
 
 22. Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 23. Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Market Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 24. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).  
 26. GoPets Ltd., 657 F.3d at 1030.  
 27. Id. at 1030-31. 
 28. Schmidheiny v. Weber, 319 F.3d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 29. Id.  
 30. See GoPets Ltd.., F.3d at 1031.  
 31. Id. 
5
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B.  Bad Faith Under the ACPA 
When Congress enacted the ACPA they laid out nine non-exhaustive 
factors to guide courts in determining what constitutes bad faith, 
enabling the courts to consider such factors as the trademark and 
intellectual property rights of the person, the legal name of the domain 
name owner, the prior use of the domain name, the current use of the 
domain, and the intent to divert consumers from the mark owner’s own 
online location, among others.32 Again, these factors are non-exhaustive. 
Thus, Congress also empowered the courts to look outside of the factors 
that Congress drafted to make their own determination of bad faith; 
Congress wanted the courts to treat these issues on a case-by-case basis 
and reach a decision based upon the intent of the parties in litigation.   
C.  The Purpose of the ACPA 
Ultimately, the purpose of the ACPA is to prevent cyberpirates from 
buying up domain names and then holding them for ransom over the 
proper owners.33 While there are always many reasons Congress may 
pass legislation – lobbying from corporations, businesses, and special 
interest groups, for example – the ACPA is somewhat unique in that the 
federal government itself had a special interest in preventing 
cybersquatting.  
All federal government websites have the URL ending “.gov.”34 Only 
government domains can obtain the “.gov” notation, but that does not 
necessarily prevent other parties from squatting on similarly worded 
websites but with the “.com” or “.org” ending. In fact, this very situation 
arose prior to the passing of the ACPA.35 The official website of the 
White House is “whitehouse.gov.”36 
Cybersquatting made locating the “whitehouse.gov” website more 
difficult. As Internet usage became more and more common, schools 
began teaching students how to use the Internet, often assigning research 
assignments to help students become more comfortable with using the 
Internet. These students, and likely many of the teachers, did not 
recognize that a government website would need to end in “.gov” 
because most people default to the “.com” ending when searching a 
 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2012); See also Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, H.R. 
106-412, 106th Cong. §1 (1999) at 8.  
 33. See Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 777 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 34. Ted Bridis, Whitehouse.com to get out of the porn business, SEATTLE PI (Feb. 10, 2004, 
10:00 AM), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Whitehouse-com-to-get-out-of-the-porn-business-
1136674.php.  
 35. Id.  
 36. THE WHITE HOUSE, www.whitehouse.gov.  
6
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URL browser.  So imagine the surprise students, teachers, and the 
general public alike experienced in the late 1990’s when 
“whitehouse.com” did not lead to an informational website about the 
President’s home, but rather to a pornography website.37  
“Whitehouse.com” was purchased by Daniel Parisi with the intent of 
starting a forum for the average person to discuss political issues facing 
America.38 However, he quickly discovered that political discourse was 
not profitable and changed the direction the website to pornography, a 
very profitable industry.39  Parisi eventually sold the domain name to the 
federal government, deciding to get out of the pornography business 
because his young son would learn about the Internet in school.40  When 
Parisi made the decision to sell the website, he elected to be 
discretionary in his sale, making sure that the site would not be used in 
pornography again.41  Today, the “whitehouse.com” website simply 
contains a picture of the White House, but it is easy to see why Congress 
would be motivated to prevent these problems in the future.  
The Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy court discussed the legislative 
intent of the ACPA as it applied to “registration” in its opinion.42  The 
court looked to the Oxford English dictionary for the definition of “re-
register,” which is defined as “[t]o register again.”43  Based on that 
definition, the Jysk court decided that the language was “plain and 
unambiguous.”44  
III.  PERTINENT CASES 
Proper understanding of the issue created by conflicting 
interpretations of “registration” under the ACPA requires a discussion of 
the pertinent case law. This section summarizes three pertinent cases 
that analyzed “registration” under the ACPA under two different 
interpretations.  First, this section summarizes the contract law 
interpretation through the Third Circuit’s decision in Schmidheiny v. 
Weber and the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Jysk Bed’N 
Linen v. Dutta-Roy. Second, this section summarizes the property 
interpretation through the Ninth Circuit’s decision in GoPets Ltd. v. 
Hise.  
 
 37. Brindis, supra  note 34.  
 38. Adam Blenford, Political Porn Site Does the Adult Thing, THE GUARDIAN (February 10, 
2004, 7:03 AM EST) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2004/feb/10/usnews.internationalnews  
 39. Id.  
 40. Brindis, supra note 34  
 41. Blenford, supra note 38  
 42. See Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 777 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. 
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A.  The Contract Law View 
1.  Schmidheiny v. Weber: New Contract with Registrant Creates New 
Registration 
In Schmidheiny v. Weber, the plaintiff, Stephan Schmidheiny, brought 
an action against Steven Weber for violating the ACPA. Specifically, 
Schmidheiny alleged that Weber violated the Anti-cybersquatting Act in 
15 U.S.C. § 1129 (currently 15 U.S.C. § 8131), which protected the 
names of living persons from cyberpiracy.45  This provision states that 
any person who registered a domain name in the name of another living 
person with the intent to profit would be liable in a civil action.46 
Weber owned the domain name “schmidheiny.com” through his 
company Famology.com Inc., of which Weber was the President and 
Treasurer.47 In November of 2000, Weber contacted Stephan 
Schmidheiny’s assistant in an attempt to sell to Schmidheiny the domain 
name “schmidheiny.com.”48 Schmidheiny was one of the richest people 
in the world, with a net worth of over $3.1 billion dollars, and as such 
would be highly motivated to prevent a third party from operating a 
domain name containing his name.49   
The district court granted summary judgment to Weber, finding that 
Weber’s registration of “schmidheiny.com” was not covered by the 
ACPA because Weber created the website before the Congress enacted 
the statute.50  While the Third Circuit agreed that the statute was not 
retroactive – a decision with which many other courts disagree51 – the 
court overturned the summary judgment decision because Weber had re-
registered the domain name after the statute was enacted.52 
In March of 2000, the registrant for “schmidheiny.com” was “Weber 
Net” and the domain registrar was Network Solutions, Inc.53  However, 
in June of 2000, a new registrant, Farmology.com, bound itself to the 
new registration agreement with a new registrar, Internet Names 
Worldwide, through a one-year contract.54  Essentially, Weber re-
registered the domain name to his other company and with a new 
registrar. Thus, the Third Circuit found that the question before the court 
 
 45. Schmidheiny v. Weber, 319 F.3d 581, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 46. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1129). 
 47. Id. at 581-582.  
 48. Id. at 581.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 580.  
 51. Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Market Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 52. Weber, 319 F.3d at 582.  
 53. Id. at 583.  
 54. Id.   
8
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was whether the re-registration by Weber qualified as “registration” 
under the Anti-cybersquatting Act.55  
The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that this re-registration was a 
“registration” for the purposes of the Anti-cybersquatting Act and based 
their findings on contract law.56 Specifically, the Third Circuit stated 
that “[w]e do not consider the ‘creation date’ of a domain name to 
control whether a registration is subject to the Anti-cybersquatting Act, 
and we believe that the plain meaning of the word ‘registration’ is not 
limited to ‘creation registration.’”57  Thus, the new registration by 
Weber created a “new contract” with the registrant.58 Because this 
registration occurred after the enactment of the statute, the new 
registration was covered by the ACPA.59 
2.  Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy: Each Registration Is a New Contract 
In Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, the plaintiff, Jysk Bed’N Linen, 
brought an action against the defendant, Monosij Dutta-Roy, for 
violation of the ACPA. Jysk contracted with Dutta-Roy and his 
associates, to create a website for Jysk’s retail furniture store.60  Jysk 
instructed Dutta-Roy to register “bydesignfurniture.com,” with Jysk 
listed as the owner.61  However, when Dutta-Roy registered 
“bydesignfurniture.com,” he listed himself, rather than Jysk, as the 
owner.62  Initially, Dutta-Roy and his associates formed Bazaarworks, 
LLC to work on the website.63 However, the relationship between Jysk 
and Bazaarworks fell apart, so Dutta-Roy took over through her 
company, Dead Dog, Inc., and monitored and controlled the website.64 
On April 9, 2012, the registration of “bydesignfurniture.com” expired 
and the website went down.65 When that happened, Jysk quickly learned 
that Dutta-Roy had not registered the website in Jysk’s name as 
instructed.66  Jysk asked Dutta-Roy to re-register the website in Jysk’s 
name, but Dutta-Roy refused.67 Instead, Dutta-Roy re-registered the 
 
 55. Id. at 584. 
 56. Id. at 583. 
 57. Id. at 582.  
 58. Id. at 583.  
 59. Id.   
 60. Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 771 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 61. Id. at 771-772. 
 62. Id. at 772.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.   
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.   
 67. Id.   
9
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website in his own name and simultaneously registered the domain 
names: “bydesignfurniture.org,” “bydesignfurnitures.com,” and 
“bydesign-furnitures.com.”68  Subsequently, Dutta-Roy offered to sell 
all four domain names to Jysk.69  Jysk refused and instead filed a lawsuit 
against Dutta-Roy.70 
The district court granted summary judgment to Jysk on the ACPA 
issue but did so without providing its reasoning. Dutta-Roy appealed, 
arguing that “his re-registration of bydesignfurniture.com, on which the 
District Court based its finding of bad faith, could not have violated the 
ACPA because re-registrations are not ‘registrations’ within the purview 
of the statute.”71 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Dutta-Roy’s argument and 
interpreted the statute through the lens of contract, rather than property 
law. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that each registration of a domain 
name was a new contract between the registrar and the registrant.72  
Because the ACPA did not define “registration,” and because it did not 
contain the words “initial” or “creation” in reference to a registration, 
the Eleventh Circuit was unwilling to read those words into the statute. 
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned,  
 
[i]ncluding re-registrations under the registration hook comports 
with the purpose of Congress in enacting the ACPA — to prevent 
cybersquatting… It would be nonsensical to exempt the bad-faith 
re-registration of a domain name simply because the bad-faith 
behavior occurred during a noninitial registration, thereby allowing 
the exact behavior that Congress sought to prevent.73 
 
Thus, using the plain meaning and congressional intent, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that a re-registration “falls within the purview of the 
ACPA” and upheld the decision of the district court.74 
 
 68. Id.   
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 774. It should be noted that at this point Dutta-Roy was proceeding pro se. His 
attorneys had requested and were granted removal from the lawsuit because they were unable to agree 
with Dutta-Roy on a litigation strategy. Dutta-Roy’s argument about the ACPA was “read generously” 
by the Eleventh Circuit. 
 72. Id. at 777. 
 73. Id. at 777-778. 
 74. Id. at 778.  
10
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B.  The Property Law View 
1.  GoPets Ltd. v. Hise: “Registration” Means Only the Initial 
Registration  
In GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, the plaintiff, Bethke, brought an action against 
the defendants, Edward and Joseph Hise, under the ACPA.75  Edward 
Hise registered the domain name “gopets.com” in his name in 1999. At 
the time, Edward Hise registered the name for a marketing class and was 
planning to develop a business around “gopets.com.”76  Edward Hise 
and his brother Joseph Hise collectively owned the corporation Digital 
Overture, which provided Internet-related services to clients.77  Included 
in these services was registration domain names, of which Digital 
Overture had registered more than 1,300.78 
Bethke founded the company GoPets Ltd. in 2004, five years after 
Edward Hise registered the domain name “gopets.com.” Bethke, who 
founded GoPets in Korea, registered the service mark “GoPets” in the 
United States on September 30, 2004.79  Over the next year, Bethke 
made multiple offers to the Hises in an attempt to purchase 
“gopets.com,” all of which were either ignored or rejected.80  
Eventually, Bethke filed a claim against Edward Hise in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. However, the arbitrator found for 
Hise because the domain name was not initially filed in bad faith.81  
After the arbitrator’s decision, Bethke made two more offers to buy the 
domain name, one for $5,000 and another for $40,000.82  Edward Hise 
rejected both offers and presented a counter-offer to Bethke’s investors, 
offering to sell the domain name for five million dollars.83 
After sending the counter-offer, Edward Hise transferred the 
registration of “gopets.com” to his brother’s corporation, Digital 
Overture.84  Finally, in March of 2007, GoPets Ltd. filed an action in the 
Central District of California alleging that the Hises violated the ACPA 
by cybersquatting.85  In May of 2008, the district court granted summary 
 
 75. GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 76. Id. at 1026-1027.  
 77. Id. at 1027.  
 78. Id.   
 79. Id.   
 80. Id.   
 81. Id. at 1028.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1029.  
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judgement to GoPets Ltd. and the Hises appealed.86   
Bethke and GoPets conceded that “gopets.com” was not “identical or 
confusingly similar to” a protected mark because Edward Hise 
registered the domain name in 1999, five years before GoPets Ltd. was 
founded.87  Rather, the thrust of their argument was that the term 
“registration” in the ACPA should be read to include both initial 
registrations and re-registrations.88 Thus, GoPets argued that the re-
registration of the domain name by Digital Overtures should be 
interpreted as a registration within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1).89   
The GoPets court chose to interpret the ACPA “in light of traditional 
property law… conclud[ing] that Congress meant ‘registration’ to refer 
only to the initial registration.”90  Therefore, the re-registration by 
Digital Overtures was not a “registration” within the meaning of 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1), and the transfer and re-registration did not violate 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) and Digital Overtures retained the rights to the 
domain names.91  
By interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) through the lens of property 
law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a domain name, much like other 
types of property, are alienable. The court stated, “[t]he general rule is 
that a property owner may sell all of the rights he holds in property.”92  
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that GoPet’s proposal would make 
“rights to many domain names effectively inalienable, whether the 
alienation is by gift, inheritance, sale, or other form of transfer.”93 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
The discussion section analyzes the legislative intent of Congress and 
how the GoPets interpretation of “registration” comports with 
Congress’s intent. The discussion section also examines the issues raised 
by the property rights people have in their own name.  Finally, this 
section considers why courts should look for bad faith in the initial 
registration of a domain name and how using a property interpretation of 
“registration,” properly applied, should be employed by the courts.  
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1030. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1031. 
 91. Id. at 1032 
 92. Id. at 1031. 
 93. Id. at 1032. 
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A.  Legislative Intent 
The Jysk court determined that the definition of “registration” was 
plain and unambiguous, but never addressed the breadth and expanse of 
“registration” by itself.  The court defined “re-register” and, based on 
that definition, assumed that every “re-registration” would be exactly the 
same as an initial registration.94 This over-simplification of 
“registration” leads to a plethora of potential problems.  
As the GoPets court pointed out, there were a number of actions that 
could constitute a “re-registration” of a domain name, including such 
actions as updating the registration, transferring the registration, 
updating billing information, and many more.95  In contrast, the Jysk 
court assumed that a re-registration was always a for-profit or 
protectionist alienation of the domain name; the Jysk court did not 
address or consider the other actions that may fall within the purview of 
“re-registration,” limiting their definition.  
Ignoring other actions that may fall within this definition of re-
registration becomes problematic in cases like GoPets. If a registrant 
buys a domain name with the intention of creating a website – even if 
that website never comes to fruition – a company should not be able to 
come in and predatorily litigate for ownership of the domain name.  
Obviously, this is a rather narrow set of circumstances, but not 
completely uncommon. In GoPets, Hise created the website before 
GoPets Ltd. was founded.96 Later, Bethke founded his company and 
then wanted to obtain the website for his own personal use.97 Under a 
contract interpretation, Hise would be forever prevented from taking 
action on his domain name for fear that this new company, GoPets Ltd., 
could come in and argue that the re-registration was done in bad faith 
because Hise was not using the website, and because the domain name 
was confusingly similar to a registered trademark.  
Surely Congress did not intend for a person to never be able to update 
their billing information, to re-register their domain after it expired, or to 
make it inalienable to others. Yet when interpreting the statute in the 
light of contract law, courts have the potential to do exactly that. 
Moreover, Congress gave courts a very strong mandate in requiring bad 
faith by the registrant.98 Considering the history of the enactment and 
the bad faith requirement, Congress did not intend to infringe on the 
property rights of domain registrants.  
 
 94. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 778. 
 95. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030-31. 
 96. Id. at 1028 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
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B.  The Courts have a “People Problem”  
When reviewing a problem like that of Schmidheiny or any of the 
political candidates discussed above, it might be easy to ask, “Why not 
trademark your name to protect yourself from cybersquatting?” A 
famous person who does not own domain names associated with their 
name could have their name used by other individuals if it is not 
protected in some other way. Thus, it would seemingly make sense to 
trademark their name.  
However, this is not a valid solution. Generally, people do not have a 
property right to their own name. Rather, their name has to be used in 
connection with goods and services.99  In 2010, former governor of 
Alaska and Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin attempted to 
trademark her name.100  Her initial application was denied for two 
distinct reasons.101  First, Palin neglected to sign the application, which 
was needed to show her consent. Second, she did not show that the 
applied-for mark was used “in commerce for each class of goods and/or 
services.”102  Thus, because Palin was not selling anything or providing 
a service, her application was denied.103  
For comparison, consider the Trademark application of Darrelle 
Revis, a defensive back for the New York Jets. Revis applied to have his 
name, and specifically the phrase “Revis Island,” trademarked.104 Unlike 
Palin, however, Revis sold t-shirts and other merchandise with “Revis 
Island” printed on them.105   Because Revis was selling a product in 
connection with his name, his application was approved.106 Conversely, 
Palin’s application did not indicate that she sold goods or provided a 
service and was, therefore, denied.  Had Palin begun selling a product –
like Palin’s Pig Lipstick – her application to trademark her name might 
have been accepted.  
So, consider someone like Jeb Bush, whose problems with website 
redirects were discussed in Part I of this Casenote. Bush is a career 
politician whose name, much like Sarah Palin’s, is not used in the 
 
 99. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005).  
 100. Jessica Hopper, Sarah and Bristol Palin Want to Tradmark Their Names, ABC NEWS (Feb. 
4. 2011) http://abcnews.go.com/US/sarah-palin-bristol-palin-file-trademark-names/story?id=12843405.  
 101. Id.  
 102. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85170226.85/170,226 (filed Nov. 29, 2010).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Marc Sessier, Darrelle Revis Approved for ‘Revis Island’ Trademark, NFL.com (Oct. 13, 
2013) http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000263616/article/darrelle-revis-approved-for-revis-
island-trademark  
 105. Beth Hutchens, Trademark of Sarah Palin, You Can Trademark Your Name, IPWATCHDOG 
(Feb. 11, 2011) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/02/11/trademark-of-sarah-palin/id=15274/.  
 106. Supra, note 104.  
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commerce for goods or services. He cannot trademark his name, so his 
best option is to buy up as many domain names containing his name as 
possible. However, it is possible that many, if not all, of these domain 
names may have been previously purchased. Should that be the case, 
Bush would still have valid recourse if the domain names are viewed in 
the light of traditional property law, all while protecting the interests of 
other purchasers.  
Contrast the couple who purchased “JebBushforPresident.com” with 
that of Janet LaCelle, the woman who purchased multiple Hillary 
Clinton domain names. It is true that the couple that purchased 
“JebBushforPresident.com” did not have any affiliation with the Bush 
name.107 However, they elected to create a website to voice their opinion 
of the Republican candidate and inform the general public of their 
dislike.108 While they were not selling anything, they were also not 
trying to profit from Jeb Bush’s name.109 Conversely, LeCelle made 
these purchases for one reason only: to profit.110 While there is nothing 
wrong with LeCelle’s entrepreneurial spirt, she was not providing a 
good or service to society as a whole. 
Similarly, a person who buys large parcels of land and then holds 
them without doing anything valuable with the land can be treated 
harshly though the doctrine of adverse possession.111  While adverse 
possession is clearly not an option in the cyber-world, Congress has 
provided a remedy through the ACPA’s bad faith requirement: if a 
person buys domain names, holding them indefinitely without creating 
anything on the website, and attempts to auction them off years later, 
then the original purchase was made in bad faith.112 Someone like 
LeCelle never intended to make a political statement or open a forum for 
discussion on the validity of Hillary Clinton as a politician; she simply 
intended to profit.  
Generally speaking, people can create a domain name using someone 
else’s name, or a name strikingly similar thereto, as long as they are not 
profiting from the website.113  Much like the owners of 
“JebBushforPresident.com,” those that create websites in an attempt to 
address an opposing view can use any domain name they choose so long 
as they are not attempting to profit from it. But what about someone 
who purchases a domain name and then creates an arbitrary or 
 
 107. Supra note 2.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Wang, supra note 1.  
 111. Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. 1952).  
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III). 
 113. Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 312 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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meaningless website? Was the website creation done in good faith?  
For this reason, the courts should look for bad faith in the initial 
registration of the domain name. Consider the website 
“ElectBernie.com” discussed earlier.  The owners of “ElectBernie.com” 
stated in their “About” page that someday they would need to find a 
reason why they chose their particular domain name.114 Presumably, the 
owners are not named “Bernie” and they are not running for political 
office.  Moreover, if they truly wanted to create a website about traffic 
safety, there are likely far more applicable domain names that the 
owners could have chosen.  
If Bernie Sanders decided to run for President again or if he just 
needed a new website for a subsequent senatorial run, it is possible that 
this website could be the subject of litigation. Interpreting the 
registration under property law, the court should take a wait-and-see 
approach. If the current owners continue to use the website for traffic 
safety and do not attempt to sell anything or disparage Bernie Sander’s 
name, it is likely that Sanders would have no claim against them.  
Imagine, however, that the owners decided to sell “ElectBernie.com” 
to a political opponent’s campaign for thousands, or even millions, of 
dollars. They would transfer the domain name and receive payment for 
the sale, and the Sanders’ campaign may decide to sue. Under a contract 
interpretation, the courts would look at whether the second registration, 
or the transfer registration, was done in bad faith. It is likely that the 
court would decide that it was, in fact, done in bad faith, and Sanders 
could get the domain.   
Conversely, consider the same circumstances in light of traditional 
property law. The courts would look to see if the original registration 
was done in bad faith. In this instance, the court would consider the 
name of the domain owners,115 the prior use of the domain name and the 
goods and services offered,116  the intent to divert customers,117 and the 
later offer to sell the domain name.118 Given these factors and 
consideration, it is not hard to imagine that the owners bought 
“ElectBernie.com” with the intent of eventually profiting from it, rather 
than informing the public about traffic safety issues.  
However, if the owners of “ElectBernie.com” continued to operate a 
traffic safety website and later wanted to transfer it to another company 
they owned, re-register it generally, update their billing information, or 
even transfer it to a friend who enthusiastically supported traffic safety, 
 
 114. Supra note 13.  
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012).  
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III) (2012). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (2012). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2012). 
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they would be protected. So long as the owners of the website are not 
attempting to profit from Bernie Sanders’ name, they would be 
protected and allowed to continue their oddly-named traffic safety 
website.119 
To streamline future litigation, the courts should look at the actions of 
the parties and what makes the most sense in light of those actions. If a 
person buys a domain name that is unrelated to any subsequent use and 
they eventually use it in an attempt to profit, the courts have substantial 
leeway to decide whether or not the registration was made in bad faith. 
In fact, the courts can even look outside the nine bad faith guidelines to 
determine the intent of the parties at the time of registration.120 
Congress gave the courts considerable power to interpret the intent of 
a party that buys a domain name. Although the inquiry may be more 
difficult, it is far better that the courts make these determinations on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than opening registrants to the possibility of 
litigation each time they re-register their domain name.  
C.  Looking for Original “Bad Faith” 
When drafting the ACPA, Congress designated nine non-exhaustive 
factors for courts to consider when determining if a person has “bad 
faith” in their registration of a domain name.121  Additionally, Congress 
gave the courts leeway to determine if a the registrant had reason to 
believe that the their registration was in good faith.122  When applying 
these nine factors, Congress did not give any guidance as to which 
factors may weigh more heavily or if a party has to “win” a certain 
number of these factors in order to prove bad faith.123  In other words, 
the courts can, at their discretion, weigh these factors in light of the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case.124 
It is in this area where both the Schmidheiny and Jysk courts erred 
because both courts elected to jump straight into an analysis of whether 
a “re-registration” falls within the purview of a “registration.”125 Instead, 
these courts should have first determined if there was initial bad faith in 
registration of the domain names.  
In Schmidheiny, the court made two mistakes: (1) they assumed that 
the ACPA did not retroactively apply to domain names created before 
 
 119. See generally Falwell, 420 F.3d.  
 120. Sporty’s Farm LLC v. Sportsman’s Market Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000)..  
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).  
 122. Id.  
 123. See Falwell, 420 F.3d at 319-20.  
 124. Id.  
 125. GoPets, 657 F.3d at 1030; Jysk, 810 F.3d at 774.  
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the passing of the ACPA;126 and (2) they did not look for bad faith in the 
original registration of the domain name.127  
The Schmidheiny court, without discussion, assumed that domain 
registrations made before the passing of the ACPA did not apply 
retroactively.128 This very issue was addressed earlier in the Second 
Circuit case, Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc.129 There, the 
Second Circuit had to decide if the ACPA, which had not been enacted 
at the time of the district court’s decision, should apply.130 After holding 
a hearing on that issue, the Second Circuit stated, “We think that it is 
clear that the new law was adopted specifically to provide courts with a 
preferable alternative to stretching federal dilution law when dealing 
with cybersquatting cases.”131 In other words, the Second Circuit 
decided to apply the ACPA retroactively whereas the Third Circuit 
chose not to without any discussion.  
Had the Schmidheiny court chosen to apply the ACPA retroactively, 
their analysis might have been entirely different. In this instance, the 
Schmidheiny court could have determined whether the original 
registration was made in bad faith and, thus, violated the ACPA. From 
the facts of the case, Weber most likely intended to use 
“Schmidheiny.com” to profit from Mr. Schmidheiny because 
Schmidheiny is such a unique name. Furthermore, Weber never had any 
particular problem with or peculiar support of Schmidheiny that would 
lead him to create a website on Schmidheiny’s behalf.132 Instead, Weber 
bought the domain name with the likely intent to profit off of 
Schmidheiny. Because Schmidheiny sued Weber to obtain the rights to 
the domain name, it is unclear what Weber might have done with the 
domain name had Schmidheiny refused to pay the requested amount; it 
is also possible that Weber intended to use the domain name to harm 
Schmidheiny in some way.  
Even so, the Schmidheiny court’s analysis of the bad faith 
requirement would not change at all. As long as Schmidheiny could 
show that Weber had initial bad faith, there would be no reason not to 
find for Schmidheiny under a property law analysis. Instead, however, 
the court chose not to address that particular issue; they chose to focus 
solely on the re-registration of the domain name.133  
 
 126. Schmidheiny, 319 F.3d at 582. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Sporty’s Farms, 202 F.3d at 497.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.   
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
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Similarly, the Jysk court chose not to look for an original bad faith 
registration and instead focused on the re-registration of the domain 
name. In Jysk, the defendant, Dutta-Roy, was instructed to register the 
domain name in Jysk’s name, an order that he apparently ignored.134 
During the time that the domain was active, Dutta-Roy neither used it 
nor had any real interest in it.135 Jysk used the domain for his business 
and had an interest in maintaining the website for his business 
purposes.136  
The Jysk court does not address whether the original registration was 
made in bad faith. However, had they analyzed it, the argument could be 
made that Dutta-Roy’s refusal to register the domain in Jysk’s name was 
done in bad faith.  This argument is further supported after considering 
subheadings III, IV, and VI in the bad faith section of the ACPA.137   
Subheading III states, “the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain 
name in connection with a bona fide offering of any goods or 
services.”138 Here, the only goods or services Dutta-Roy offered was to 
create the website and register the domain name.139 Essentially, he was 
hired to build something for Jysk and then turn it over to Jysk. Just 
because Dutta-Roy created and registered the website does not mean he 
should have any rights to it once it had been turned over to Jysk. Like a 
carpenter who creates the furniture that Jysk sells and who has no rights 
to it once he has been paid, Dutta-Roy forfeited his property rights to the 
domain name at the time he should have turned it over. Moreover, 
Dutta-Roy never used the website for commercial purposes.140 He 
simply held onto the domain name in an attempt to profit off of Jysk’s 
business when the domain name registration expired.141 
Subheading IV states, “The person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair 
use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name.”142 Much 
like the analysis of subheading III above, Dutta-Roy did not use the 
website for any purpose at all.143 Dutta-Roy’s only access to the domain 
name was to create a website for Jysk that Jysk would then use in his 
 
 134. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 771-772. 
 135. Id. at 772.  
 136. Id.  
 137. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 138. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III) (2012). 
 139. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 771. 
 140. See Victoria’s Secret Stores v. Artco Equip. Co. 194 F.Supp.2d 704 at 722, (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(holding that bad faith is found under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III) when a registrant holds the 
domain name of a well-known website and does not offer goods and services of his own).  
 141. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 772. 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (2012). 
 143. See generally, Jysk, 810 F.3d. 
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business.144 At no time did Dutta-Roy ever attempt to use the website to 
promote or inform the public or for any other non-commercial use.145  
Finally, subheading VI states: 
 
[T]he person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the 
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial 
gain without having used, or having an intent to use, the domain 
name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the 
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct . . .146 
 
Here, Dutta-Roy offered to sell Jysk a website that would have 
belonged to Jysk had the original deal been properly executed.147 At no 
point was Dutta-Roy using the website for his own commercial gain.148 
In fact, Jysk was the only party using the domain name for commercial 
gain at all.149  
Had the Jysk court chosen to analyze the issue in the light of property 
law, they would have reached the same conclusion while still protecting 
the property rights of other litigants. Congress gave the courts 
significant discretion in deciding whether or not bad faith exists. 
Moreover, the list for bad faith is not exhaustive.150 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Possibly the most interesting aspect of Schmidheiny, GoPets, and Jysk 
is that each court arrived at what most casual observers would consider 
to be the “right” conclusion. All three decisions aligned with the purpose 
of enacting the ACPA. In some regards, it should be considered a 
positive that the courts were able to reach an equitable decision. The 
Schmidheiny and Jysk courts, however, while “correct,” were correct for 
the wrong reasons.  
When the courts in Schmidheiny and Jysk chose to interpret the 
ACPA in the light of contract law, they neglected to consider the 
implications these decisions would have on registrants holding a domain 
name in good faith. In effect, these courts deprived registrants of the 
intellectual property rights that they might have held in their domain 
names. Under this interpretation of the ACPA, registrants cannot re-
 
 144. Id. at 772. 
 145. See generally, Jysk, 810 F.3d. 
 146. Id.  15 U.S.C. § 1225(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) (2012).  
 147. Jysk, 810 F.3d at 780. 
 148. See Id., generally . 
 149. Id.  
 150. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am.., Inc.., 238 F.3d 264, 268-269 (4th Cir. 2001).  
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register their domain names without fear of predatory litigation, and re-
registration could be a transfer to another party, an update of billing 
information, or a simple re-registration of a soon-to-expire domain 
name. Given the breadth of possible interpretations and the subsequent 
problems, a property law interpretation is superior.  
If the ACPA is interpreted in the light of property law, as it was in the 
GoPets case, the rights of registrants, business owners, trademark 
owners, and personal names can all be protected. Congress gave the 
courts nine non-exhaustive factors to consider when determining if a 
registration was made in bad faith. Therefore, the courts should use that 
power to determine if there is bad faith at the original registration. If the 
courts can determine, by a preponderance of evidence, that there was 
bad faith in the original registration of the domain name, they should 
find for the aggrieved party. However, if the courts cannot find bad faith 
in the original registration, then the registrant should retain his or her 
property rights in the domain name and be allowed to do whatever he or 
she would like with it. If that includes later selling it for a profit, keeping 
it to create his or her own informative website, or just holding onto the 
property for his or her own private enjoyment, those rights should not be 
infringed.  
While it may have been far easier had “registration” been defined 
under the ACPA, Congress chose not to define it, whether intentionally 
or by omission. Thus, the courts should use the power conferred upon 
them under the ACPA to make a valid and fair judgment about whose 
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